How to find and detect novel or unknown network attacks is one of the most important objectives in current intrusion detection systems. In this paper, a rule evolution approach based on Genetic Programming (GP) for detecting novel attacks on networks is presented and four genetic operators, namely reproduction, mutation, crossover, and dropping condition operators, are used to evolve new rules. New rules are used to detect novel or known network attacks. A training and testing dataset proposed by DARPA is used to evolve and evaluate these new rules. The proof of concept implementation shows that a rule generated by GP has a low false positive rate (FPR), a low false negative rate and a high rate of detecting unknown attacks. Moreover, the rule base composed of new rules has high detection rate with low FPR. An alternative to the DARPA evaluation approach is also investigated.
INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection has been extensively studied since the seminal report written by Anderson (1980) . Traditionally, intrusion detection techniques are divided into misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection techniques mainly focus on developing models of known attacks, which can be described by specific patterns or sequences of events and data. Anomaly detection techniques model system or users' normal behaviors, and any deviation from the normal behaviors is considered as an intrusion. Misuse detection techniques have low false detection rates (FDR), but their major weakness is that novel or unknown attacks will go unnoticed until corresponding signatures are added to the database of the Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Anomaly detection techniques have the potential to detect novel attacks, but quite often they tend to have high FDR because it is very difficult to discriminate between abnormal and intrusive behavior.
In this paper, we propose a rule evolution approach based on Genetic Programming (GP) (Koza 1992; Wong and Leung 2000) for detecting known or novel attacks on the network. GP extends the fundamental idea of Genetic Algorithm (GA), and evolves more complex data structures. To do so, it uses parse trees to represent initial populations, instead of chromosomes. Moreover, the GP technique can be used to evolve a population of individuals, whereas GA searches the best solution in all possible solutions. Initial rules are selected based on background knowledge from known attacks and can be represented as parse trees. GP will evolve these initial rules to generate new rules. New rules are used to detect novel or known attacks. To evolve and evaluate these new rules, we use the training and testing dataset proposed by DARPA (Lippmann 2000) , which includes almost all known networkbased attacks, namely land, synflood, ping of death ( pod ), smurf, teardrop, back, neptune, ipsweep, portsweep , and UDPstorm attacks. The proof of concept implementation shows the GP-based approach can detect smurf and UDPstorm attacks, which are absent from the training dataset. The average false negative rate (FNR) for each rule is 5.04% and the average false positive rate (FPR) is 5.23%. The average rate of detecting unknown attacks for each rule is 57.14%. Moreover, we plot a receiving operator characteristic (ROC) curve of FPR and detection rate when we apply the testing dataset to evaluate our rule base. The ROC curve shows that the detection rate will be close to 100% when the (FPR) falls in the range between 1.4% and 1.8%.
The rest of the paper is organized into the following modules. Section 2 presents an overview of related works. Section 3 provides background information on genetic programming. Section 4 discusses how to use GP to generate new rules for detecting known or novel attacks on network. Section 5 presents the evaluation of the new rules using DARPA testing dataset and discusses the experimental results. Section 6 highlights the shortcomings of the DARPA evaluation approach, and then proposes an alternative evaluation approach. Finally, Section 7 makes some concluding remarks. Frank (1994) described and categorized several Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques that can be used for intrusion detection; use of AI techniques for intrusion detection is categorized according to two dimensions: behavior classification and data reduction. Behavior classification assumes that intrusion can be decided by a given set of known behaviors, and data reduction is typically used to analyze the large amount of audit-log data produced, so as to reduce the amount of data handled by human experts. However, explicit knowledge of known behaviors is difficult to establish. Any mistake occurring in the process of defining patterns of known behaviors will increase false alarm rate and decrease the effectiveness of intrusion detection.
RELATED WORKS
Some early applications of neural networks for user behavior modeling were proposed by Fox et al. (1990) . Ghosh, Wanken, and Charron (1998) later extended their idea by using back propagation algorithm for anomaly detection. They established that randomly generating anomalous input data increases the performance of anomaly detection. The biggest limitation of this method is the difficulty of choosing the input parameters. Any mistake in input data selection will increase the false alarm rate. Further, how to initialize the weights of the neural network is still an open question. Me (1992) initially proposed another application of AI to intrusion detection by using GA for misuse detection. He defined a n-dimensional hypothesis vector H , where H i = 1 if attack i was taking place according to the hypothesis, otherwise H i = 0. Thus, the aim of intrusion detection was reduced to the problem of finding the H vector that maximizes the product W × H , subject to the constraint AE · H i <= O i . W refers to the n-dimensional weight vector; AE refers to an attacks-events matrix; O refers to the observed n-dimensional audit trail vector. He showed that GA applied to misuse detection has a low false alarm rate. However, this approach cannot identify attacks precisely. Chittur (2002) extended this idea by using GA for anomaly detection. Random numbers were generated using GA. A threshold value was established and any certainty value exceeding this threshold value was classified as a malicious attack. The experimental result showed that GA successfully generated an accurate empirical behavior model from training data. The biggest limitation of this approach was the difficulty of establishing the threshold value, possibly leading to a high false alarm rate when used to detect novel or unknown attacks.
More works on using GA for intrusion detection are described in Bridges and Vaughn (2000) , Balajinath and Raghavan (2001) , Gomez et al. (2002) . Gomez et al. (2002) proposed a linear representation scheme for evolving fuzzy rules using the concept of complete binary tree structures. GA is used to generate genetic operators for producing useful and minimal structure modification to the fuzzy expression tree represented by chromosomes. This approach, however, required-time consuming training. Bridges and Vaughn (2000) employed GA to tune the fuzzy membership functions and select an appropriate set of features in their prototype IIDS (Intelligent IDS). Balajinath and Raghavan (2001) used GA to learn individual user behavior. Active user behavior is predicted by GA based on past observed user behavior and used to detect intrusion. In both approaches, the training process is time consuming and they can only be used to detect anomalous behaviors at the host level. Crosbie and Spafford (1995) employed GP and agent technology to detect anomalous behaviors in a system. The autonomous agents are used to detect intrusions using log data of network connections. Each autonomous agent is used to monitor a particular network parameter and autonomous agents that are predicting correctly are given higher weight value in deciding whether a session is intrusive or not. There are a number of advantages to having many small agents, instead of a single large one. However, communication among these agents is still an issue. Moreover, the training process may be time consuming if the proper primitive for each agent is not chosen.
OVERVIEW OF GENETIC PROGRAMMING

GP Algorithm
GP is an extension of GA (Koza 1992) . It is a general search method that uses analogies from natural selection and evolution. The main difference between them is the solution encoding method. GA encodes potential solutions for a specific problem as a simple population of fixed-length binary strings named chromosomes and then applies reproduction and recombination operators to these chromosomes to create new chromosomes. In contrast to GA, GP encodes multipotential solutions for specific problems as a population of programs or functions. The programs can be represented as parse trees. Usually, parse trees are composed of internal nodes and leaf nodes. Internal nodes are called primitive functions, and leaf nodes are called terminals. The terminals can be viewed as the inputs to the specific problem. They might include the independent variables and the set of constants. The primitive functions are combined with the terminals or simpler function calls to form more complex function calls. For instance, GP can be used to evolve new rules from general ones. The rules are represented as if condition 1 and condition 2 . . . and condition N then consequence. In this case, the primitive function corresponds to AND operator and the terminals are the conditions (e.g., condition 1, condition 2, . . . , condition N) .
GP randomly generates an initial population of solutions. Then, the initial population is manipulated using various genetic operators to produce new populations. These operators include reproduction, crossover, mutation, dropping condition, etc. The whole process of evolving from one population to the next population is called a generation. A high-level description of GP algorithm can be divided into a number of sequential steps:
1. Create a random population of programs, or rules, using the symbolic expressions provided as the initial population. 2. Evaluate each program or rule by assigning a fitness value according to a predefined fitness function that can measure the capability of the rule or program to solve the problem. 3. Use reproduction operator to copy existing programs into the new generation. 4. Generate the new population with crossover, mutation, or other operators from a randomly chosen set of parents. 5. Repeat steps 2 onwards for the new population until a predefined termination criterion has been satisfied, or a fixed number of generations have been completed. 6. The solution to the problem is the genetic program with the best fitness within all the generations. 
Genetic Operators
In GP, crossover operation is achieved firstly by reproduction of two parent trees; two crossover points are then randomly selected in the two offspring trees. Exchanging sub-trees, which are selected according to the crossover point in the parent trees, generates the final offspring trees. The obtained offspring trees are usually different from their parents in size and shape. Figure 1 describes a crossover operation between function x 2 + x + x − 2x and function 2x 2 , they produce two offspring functions 2x 2 + x and x 2 − x. Mutation operation is also considered in GP. A single parental tree is firstly reproduced. Then a mutation point is randomly selected from the reproduction, which can be either a leaf node or a sub-tree. Finally, the leaf node or the sub-tree is replaced by a new leaf node or sub-tree generated randomly. Figure 2 describes a mutation operation on function 2x 2 , the produced mutation offspring function is x 2 + 2x. A new operator named "dropping condition" is proposed to evolve new rules in this paper. It randomly selects one condition in the rule, and then turns it into any. That is, this particular condition is no longer considered in the rule. For example, the rule if condition 1 and condition 2 and condition 3 then consequence can be changed to if condition 1 and condition 2 and any then consequence FIGURE 2. Example of mutation in GP.
Fitness Function
Fitness functions ensure that the evolution is toward optimization by calculating the fitness value for each individual in the population. The fitness value evaluates the performance of each individual in the population. We use a fitness function defined in Wong and Leung (2000) that is based on the support-confidence framework. Support is a ratio of the number of records covered by the rules to the total number of records. Confidence factor (cf ) represents the accuracy of rules, which is the confidence of the consequent to be true under the conditions. It is the ratio of the number of records matching both the consequent and the conditions to the number of records matching only the conditions. If a rule is represented as, if A then B, and the size of the training dataset is N , then cf = |A and B|/ |A| ; support = |A and B|/ N.
|A| stands for the number of records that only satisfy condition A. |B| stands for the number of records that only satisfy consequent B. |A and B| stands for the number of records that satisfy both condition A and consequent B.
A rule with a high confidence factor does not necessarily behave significantly different from the average. Thus, normalized confidence factor is defined to consider the average probability of consequent denoted prob.
To avoid wasting time to evolve those rules with a low support value, a strategy is defined: if support is below a user-defined minimum threshold (min support), the confidence factor of the rule should not be considered.
Thus, the fitness function is defined as follows:
Where the weights w 1 and w 2 are user-defined and used to control the balance between the confidence and the support during the searches.
Token competition is used to increase the diversity of solutions (Leung and Yam 1992 ). The idea is as follows: In the natural environment, once an individual finds a good place to live, then (s)he will try to protect this environment and prevent newcomers from using it, unless the newcomers are stronger than this individual. Other weaker individuals are hence forced to search for their own place. In this way, the diversity of the population is increased. A token is allocated to each record in the training dataset. If a rule matches a record, its token will be seized by the rule. The priority of receiving the token is determined by the strength of the rules. Thus, a rule with high raw fitness score can acquire as many tokens as possible. The modified fitness is defined as follows:
where count is the number of tokens that the rule has actually seized, ideal is the total number of tokens that it can seize, which is equal to the number of records that the rule matches.
GENERATING NEW RULES USING GP
The use of GP to detect unknown attacks is based on the belief that new rules will have better performance than initial ones based on known attacks. Better performance means the new rules obtained after evolving the initial ones using GP will not only cover known attacks, but also possibly detect the novel ones.
Individual solution in a population is represented as a derivation tree that we describe using a string data structure. For example, a tree can be represented as "AabAcdAceI ". A means "and" operator; a, b, c, d , and e correspond to the conditions in the rules. I is the consequence, which means intrusion. The redundant conditions in the rule will be deleted after the evolution, and thus, AabAcdAceI can be interpreted as "if a and b, and, c and d and e, then intrusion." The attribute values of a,b,c,d,e are selected from known attacks.
New rules are generated in two phases. In the first step, temporary new rules are composed of new rules generated by four operators including mutation, reproduction, crossover, and dropping condition and additional rules directly generated from previous populations. Thus, the number of temporary new rules is doubled. In the second phase, one half of the temporary new rules with the highest fitness scores after token competition are retained and passed to the next generation.
To assess the feasibility and efficiency of GP for intrusion detection, we have selected an initial population of 40 rules that cover a series of network-based attacks. Table 1 shows 10 instances of the initial rules; the rest of the rules are given in Appendix A.
We calculate the fitness value for each rule based on the training dataset. Currently, the most widely used training and testing dataset for anomaly detection is provided by DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program (Lippmann 2000) , consisting of the raw TCP dump data of 9 weeks activity in a local area network simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN. The training dataset is labeled as either normal or intrusive. The test dataset is similar with the training dataset. The only difference is the test dataset includes some unknown attacks not occurring in the training dataset.
In our case, 10,000 network connection records provided by DARPA training dataset are used to train the rules, each connection lasting 2s. Eleven parameters defined in DARPA dataset are used to describe the attacks in the training dataset. Table 2 describes these parameters and their meaning.
The rules in the initial population are evolved using mutation, crossover, and dropping condition operators. The rates of crossover, mutation, and dropping condition operations are respectively 0.6, 0.01, and 0.001 for each rule. Forty offspring rules are evolved from the previous forty parent rules. Based on token competition, combining offspring rules with parent rules generates temporary new rules. One half of the temporary new rules with highest fitness scores after token competition are selected as the new rules. Number of connections from the same source host to the same destination host srv count Number of connections from the same source service to the same destination service dst host count Number of connections from the same destination host to the same source host dst host srv count Number of connections from the same destination service to the same source service The evolution will not be terminated until we have executed 5,000 runs or the fitness value for each rule is bigger than a threshold equal to 0.95. Table 3 describes 10 instances of obtained new rules. To view the rest of the new rules, please refer to Appendix A.
The initial and new rules are composed of attribute descriptors. Table 4 shows attribute descriptors representations and meanings.
EVALUATION OF NEW RULES
Evaluation of intrusion detection approaches for detecting novel attacks is an important and multi-faceted problem. The training dataset we use is one day's connection records provided by DARPA, consisting of 10,000 connection records. Eight kinds of network attacks are included in the training dataset, namely land, synflood, pod, teardrop, back, neptune, ipsweep, and portsweep. The testing dataset we use is another one-day activity consisting of For each rule, we calculate its FPR, FNR, and UADR independently. We find that every time we use GP to evolve the rules, the number of generated rules is different and thus the FPR, FNR, and UADR for each rule is also different. Therefore, to statistically evaluate the efficiency of our GP-based approach, FPR, FNR, and UADR are defined as the arithmetical average of the sum of all new rules' rates Since the number of new rules is different in each run, the average FPR, FNR, and UADR for each run is also different. We execute 10,000 runs and plot the probability distribution of FPR, FNR, and UADR. Figure 3a illustrates the FPR's probability distribution and Figure 3b illustrates the log scale probability distribution. Figure 4a illustrates the FNR's probability distribution and Figure 4b illustrates the log scale probability distribution. Figure 5a illustrates the UADR's probability distribution and Figure 5b illustrates the log scale probability distribution. The standard deviation of FPR for each rule over 10,000 runs is 0.0944 and the average value of FPR for each rule over 10,000 runs is 0.0523. The confidence interval or, margin of error is 0.0019. In the figure of Log Scale Distribution of FPR, we amplify the probability difference of different FPR scales, and conclude that the probability of the rules whose FPRs fall in a range between 0 and 0.1 is about 10 times greater than the probability of rules whose FPRs fall in other ranges, such as between 0.1 and 0.2, 0.2 and 0.3, etc. Table 5 summarizes this information.
The standard deviation of FNR for each rule over 10,000 runs is 0.0801 and the average value of FNR for each rule over 10,000 runs is 0.0504. The margin of error is 0.0016. In the figure of Log Scale Distribution of FNR, we amplify the probability difference of different FNR scales, and conclude that the probability of the rules whose FNRs fall in a range between 0 and 0.1 is about 10 times greater than the probability of rules whose FNRs fall in other ranges, such as between 0.1 and 0.2, 0.2 and 0.3, etc. Table 6 summarizes this information.
The standard deviation of UADR for each rule over 10,000 runs is 0.397 and the average value of UADR for each rule over 10,000 runs is 0.2509. The margin of error is 0.00794. In the figure of Log Scale Distribution of UADR, we amplify the probability difference of different UADR scales, and conclude that the UADR for each rule in about 20% of the runs are bigger than 0.9 and rates in 70% of the runs fall in a range between 0 and 0.1. Table 7 summarizes this information.
In practical evaluation, we usually use the rule base instead of single rule to test the performance of intrusion detection system based on GP. We execute 10,000 runs to evaluate the statistical performance of our system, since we get different rules every time. We use as evaluation metrics the FPR and the detection rate (DR). Generally speaking, we say that an intrusion detection approach is good if it has high detection rate with low. The probability distribution of FPR for the rule base over 10,000 runs is illustrated in Figure 6a . Figure 6b illustrates the same information for FPR between 0 and 0.1.
The average value of FPR over 10,000 runs is 0.41% and the standard deviation value of FPR over 10,000 runs is 0.0063. The probability distribution of DR for the rule-base in 10,000 runs is illustrated in Figure 7a . Figure 7b illustrates the log scale probability distribution of DR.
The average value of DR over 10,000 runs is 0.5714, and the standard deviation value of DR over 10,000 runs is 0.4068. Figure 8 is the ROC curve plotting the and FPR the DR.
The DR increases as the FPR does the same. The DR is close to 100% when the FPR is in the range between 1.4% and 1.8%. However, when the FPR is close to 0%, the DR is only about 40%. The DR falls in a broad range from 40% to 100% because the number of rules in the rule base is different for each run. When there are more rules in the rule base, we have a high DR and thus, will possibly have a low FPR. There are some other approaches used to detect intrusion using the DARPA's dataset as a testbed. For example, the ROC curve plotted by Eskin et al. (2000) is illustrated in Figure 9 . Figure 9 shows that DR increases as the FPR does the same. For instance, in the first week the DR is close to 100% when the FPR falls in the range between 0.06% and 0.1%. Eskin's result is better than ours considering the ROC curve comparison. However, the curve plotted by Eskin et al. is for only one kind of attack, a ftpd attack, while our ROC curve is for 10 attacks. Our approach can detect 10 kinds of attacks when the FPR is smaller than 1.8%. The approach proposed by Eskin et al. can be used to detect only one kind of attack when its FPR is smaller than 0.1%.
ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION METHOD
Approach
The conventional approach presented in the previous section for evaluating the potential of new rules to detect new forms of attacks consists of some attacks in the testing dataset that are absent from the training dataset, and then testing whether the new rules can detect them or not. There are, however, some limitations with this evaluation method. First, it does not consider the completeness of the testing dataset. Completeness refers to the extent to which the dataset represents all types of attacks. For instance, the DARPA's training dataset only contains a total of 24 attack types with an additional 14 types included in the testing dataset. Even if the rules perform well under the testing dataset, they may possibly carry errors that are not identified due to incompleteness of the testing dataset. Second, the coverage of rules by the testing dataset is not taken into account.
An incomplete testing dataset may possibly lead to an inadequate coverage of rules. Consequently, some sections of rules may not be tested due to the absence of test cases. Nevertheless, collecting all types of attacks is very difficult and even if we get all possible kinds of attacks, running them all would be time consuming. A workable alternative consists of improving the completeness of the testing dataset and increasing the coverage of rules.
We propose an alternative evaluation strategy that is depicted by Figure 10 . First, we start by building a testing dataset that provides a complete coverage of the new rules generated using GP. We evaluate the coverage of these rules by using a tool named TRUBAC (Testing with Rule-Base Coverage), which implements a coverage analysis method developed by Barr (1995 Barr ( , 1997 . Second, we apply the new testing dataset to the initial set of rules from which the new rules have been generated. Test cases that fail the initial rules are flagged as potential new attacks, since they are covered by the new rules but not by the initial ones. Then, we need to verify whether these potential attacks correspond to real attacks. This can be done by reproducing and analyzing corresponding behavior in real network environment. 6.2. Coverage Analysis Using TRUBAC TRUBAC represents a rule base using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). It is based on the premise that a rule-base is also a classification system and exploits the AND/OR graph structure inherent to the rule base. The DAG contains a source node and a sink node, corresponding respectively to the working memory and the classification result. It also contains nodes for findings and classes. Findings correspond to the antecedents of rules; classes correspond to their consequents. There are also two additional types of interior nodes: subclass nodes and operator nodes. Subclass nodes correspond to intermediate hypotheses; operator nodes correspond to logical operators such as AND and OR. There are links from the source node to each finding, and from each class to the sink. The antecedent for each rule is represented as a subgraph, which is then connected to the node for the consequent. We refer interested readers to Barr (1995 Barr ( , 1997 for more details. As an example, let us consider the following two rules:
if F1 and F2 and F3 then SC; if F4 and F5 and SC then C;  The DAG representation of these two related rules is depicted by Figure 11 . TRUBAC defines and implements five rule-base coverage measures (RBCMs), which can be used to guide the selection of testing dataset and give an idea of how well a testing dataset covers some rules. We describe briefly in the sequel these RBCMs.
RBCM1 ensures that there is at least one test data covering one execution path to each class. RBCM2 ensures that there is at least one test data covering one execution path to each subclass, as well as each class. RBCM3 ensures that for every finding-class combination, at least one execution path,
including this combination, is tested, if such path exists. RBCM4 provides test data covering at least one execution path that contains a connection from finding to class. RBCM5 ensures that some test data causes traversal of a collection of execution paths that contains every edge in the graph.
Generation of New Test Dataset
Based on the five RBCMs, we can analyze the coverage of the new rules and select appropriate test data from the initial test dataset. However, the new rule-base possibly includes some rules uncovered by the initial test dataset. Therefore, some execution paths in the DAG may not be covered by any of the available test data. Consequently, we need to update the initial testing dataset by generating additional test data according to the uncovered execution paths. In the sequel, our example illustrates how to construct the new test dataset based on the RBCMs. Consider, for instance, the ten new rules described in Table 3 . Since there is no subclass in the rule-base, corresponding DAG can be represented as shown by Figure 12, where a, c, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, p, q, r , and t are findings and I stands for intrusive behavior.
Since there is no subclass, only three RBCMs are applicable in this example: RBCM1, RBCM4, and RBCM5. Based on RBCM1, we select one test data from the testing dataset, for instance, a test data covering path "AND2(g)->I. " Based on RCBM4, we consider two execution paths each including a connection from finding a to class I , "AND1(a,t)->I " and "AND3(a,v)->I." From these two paths, we can provide one test data whose path covers the connections from finding a to I . In the same way, we can provide one test data whose paths cover the connections from finding b to I . Ideally, if each path corresponds to one connection, we will have 14 test data, which is a multiple of the number of classes and the number of findings. Table 8 lists all possible execution paths based on each possible connection.
Since the DAG does not include any subclasses, the only difference between RBCM4 and RBCM5 is that the test cases provided by RBCM4 cover only one path for each connection while the test cases provided by RBCM5 cover all paths for each connection. Finally, we generate 21 test data which can cover all new rules in the rule-base. It is possible that some paths in the DAG may not be covered by any of the available test data. Therefore, to increase the coverage of the new rules, we must synthesize the additional test data according to corresponding path. As an example, if the path "AND6(i,l)->I " is not covered by any of the test data, this means "if protocol type = udp and dst host count > 203 then intrusion." We simply need to insert manually the packet whose protocol type is UDP into the testing dataset, in order to create corresponding test case. Overall, 292 test cases are generated for the entire new rule-base involving 40 rules, 276 of which are coming from the initial test dataset and 16 are manually synthesized. Table 9 illustrates the breakdown of new test cases.
Identifying New Forms of Intrusions
We identify new forms of potential intrusions by evaluating the initial rule-base against the new data-set generated above. Any test case that fails to be covered by the initial rule-base may be considered a potential new attack. From the 292 test cases generated previously, eight failed the initial rules. Consequently, we have eight potential new attacks, which are listed as follows: 'u',0,0,19,20,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,20,21,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,21,22,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,22,23,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,23,24,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,24,25,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,25,26,255,255,0.00,0,0.00,0.00 'u',0,0,26,27,255,255,0 .00,0,0.00,0.00 Each test case includes 11 fields, corresponding (as specified in To verify whether a potential attack corresponds to a real attack, we simulate corresponding behaviors. More specifically, we use a packet generator to simulate corresponding packets in a real network environment, and then analyze the behavior of corresponding hosts, using for instance, a performance analyzer.
Attack Simulation and Results
It is very difficult to accurately simulate potential attacks on a real network. The eight potential attacks considered above involve continuously sending a defined number of UDP packets from the same source host to the same destination host. Each potential attack lasts 2s. As an example, the first potential attack means that streams of 19 UDP packets are sent from the same source host to the same destination host with a period of 2s. Figure 13 The destination host provides an online computer sale service. The simulation of each of the eight potential attacks results in a denial of service; the website becomes unavailable. The denial of service is created by a flood of UDP packets, which corresponds to an UDPStorm attack.
FIGURE 13. Simulated network topology graph.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented and evaluated a GP-based approach for detecting known or novel attacks on a network. The proof of concept implementation shows that new rules generated by GP have the potential capability to detect novel forms of attacks. However, the detection result is not good for some runs because the selection of crossover and mutation points in corresponding operations is random. In addition, deciding the probability of genetic operators selection is experience based. In our implementation, the probability of mutation and crossover are 0.01 and 0.6, respectively.
The purpose of the work reported in this paper was mainly to assess the efficiency of GP for known or novel attacks detection. The next step in our work will consist of extending the scope of the rules involved.
